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In many areas of developing countries, economic and institutional factors often 
combine to give farmers incentives to clear forests and repeatedly plant food crops 
without sufficiently replenishing the soils. These activities lead to large-scale land 
degradation and contribute to global warming through the release of greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere. We investigate whether agroforestry systems might alleviate 
these trends when carbon-credit payments are available under the Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. A meta-modelling framework is adopted, 
comprising an econometric-production model of a smallholding in Sumatra. The 
model is used within a dynamic-programming algorithm to determine optimal 
combinations of tree/crop area, tree-rotation length, and firewood harvest. Results 
show the influence of soil-carbon stocks and discount rates on optimal strategies and 
reveal interesting implications for joint management of agriculture and carbon.  
 
Keywords: bio-economic meta-modelling, Indonesia, agroforestry, carbon credits, 
dynamic programming,  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In rural areas of developing countries, economic and institutional factors often 
combine to give farmers incentives to clear forests and repeatedly plant food crops 
without sufficiently replenishing the soils.  These activities erode the natural capital 
upon which poor, rural communities depend.  Associated with large-scale 
deforestation and land degradation are substantial losses of stored soil and biomass 
carbon which contribute to global warming and climate change (Fearnside, 2001; 
Antle and McCarl, 2002; Lal, 2004; Makundi and Sathaye, 2004).  Agroforestry 
systems
1
 have the potential to mitigate these emissions by sequestering atmospheric 
carbon in biomass and soil while maintaining sustainable productivity and meeting 
local cultural requirements (Roshetko et al., 2007).  Albrecht and Kandji (2003), for 
example, estimate the carbon sequestration potential of agroforestry systems to be 
between 12 and 228 Mg ha
−1 (with a median value of 95 Mg ha
−1) with between 585 
and 1215 million ha of the earth’s area suitable for agroforestry.  Oelbermann et al. 
(2004) estimate the potential to sequester carbon in aboveground components in 
agroforestry systems to be 2.1 × 10
9 Mg C year
−1 in tropical biomes and 1.9 × 10
9 Mg 
C year
−1 in temperate biomes; but emphasise that the type of agroforestry systems and 
their capacity to sequester carbon do vary globally.  
 
Diverse policies and approaches for alleviating these trends have increasingly been 
developed and implemented. Community-based Natural Resource Management 
initiatives (Frost and Bond, 2006) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of 
the Kyoto Protocol (with many supporting Funds such as the World Bank’s 
BioCarbon Fund and Community Development Carbon Fund) are just two such 
examples. These mechanisms primarily focus on influencing the economic incentives 
driving behaviour often using market-based approaches with caveats to promote 
environmental sustainability and equity.  The Kyoto Protocol (KP) provides the policy 
context for this analysis. In particular, Articles 3.3 and 12 (Land-use, Land-use 
Change and Forestry and the Clean Development Mechanism, respectively) are 
designed to give incentives to developed countries to invest in greenhouse-gas 
mitigation activities in developing countries to help meet their Kyoto emission 
                                                 
1 Agroforestry systems are agricultural lands where trees have been introduced and judiciously managed together 
with crops and/or animals (Albrecht and Kandji, 2003)   3
limitations. Allowable activities include terrestrial carbon sinks such as small-scale 
forestry and agroforestry. However the uptake of these activities within the CDM has 
been quite low, representing only 1% of registered CDM projects by volume (Capoor 
and Ambrosi, 2007).  
 
Numerous projects around the developing world have been financed and implemented 
under the CDM and these are reviewed in detail by the FAO (FAO, 2004). The 
economics of agroforestry systems in the presence of carbon-sequestration payments 
has been intensively studied over the last decade by authors such as Cacho et al. 
(2003; 2004; 2005) and De Jong et al. (2004) among others. In this paper we develop 
a model conceptually based on a Production Possibility Frontier (PPF) representing 
the trade offs facing landholders with fixed resources and technologies to produce 
bundles of products from two land uses trees (Y1) and crops (Y2) (Figure 1). The 
optimal combination of Y1 and Y2 is determined by the price ratio p1/p2. If the present 
value of crop outputs exceeds the present value of tree outputs, the optimal point is 
likely to be located closer to the vertical axis (point E1) reflecting the current situation 
in much of the developing world where continuous cropping is often the preferred 
land-use option (Wise and Cacho, 2007). If the external environmental benefits 
provided by trees are internalised through direct payments for sequestered carbon the 
price ratio (p1/p2) will increase and landholders will plant a larger area of their land to 
trees (point E2, Figure 1). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 – PPF ] 
 
This paper builds on the study of Wise and Cacho (2007), who found that soil quality 
should drive planting decisions of an economically rational landholder. For example, 
in degraded soils it pays to plant trees to improve soil quality when incentives exist to 
participate in carbon projects. But, a threshold soil-carbon level (quality) exists where 
it becomes optimal to switch from trees to a steady-state system of crops with 
fertiliser and to not participate in carbon trading.  The corner solutions of either trees 
or crops reflect a land-use system where the complementarities between the tree and 
crop components are relatively weak. In this study, we use a similar bioeconomic 
meta-model of a tree-crop system to identify profit-maximising land-management 
strategies, but in this case the complementary interactions between trees and crops are   4
stronger and we assume no inorganic fertilisers are available; a common situation in 
rural regions of developing countries where access to markets and finance is limited – 
this situation is exacerbated by high energy prices. Therefore we assume that soil 
fertility can only be improved through nitrogen-fixation of plants and the addition of 
organic matter. 
 
2.  Study area 
 
The study area for this analysis is the Jambi province of southern Sumatra, Indonesia. 
Jambi is situated in the humid tropics and is largely covered by Sumatra’s broad 
‘peneplain’ agro-ecological zone. It is almost flat land, less than 100 m above sea 
level, and is divided into a lowlands area (10%) made up of river levees and flood-
plains with fertile alluvial soils; and an uplands area (90%) with a gently undulating 
landscape (slopes of 5-17%) (Tomich et al., 2001).  
 
This region is chosen because it is one of the Alternatives to Slash-and-Burn (ASB) 
benchmark sites and represents the equatorial rainforests of southeast Asia where 
primary forests are being cleared. The internal forces driving these land conversions 
are resettlement programs and the increasing population densities resulting from the 
inflow of migrants2, facilitated by road construction and the lack of economic 
opportunity elsewhere (Tomich et al., 2001; Palm et al., 2004). The indigenous 
practice of slash-and-burn shifting cultivation, for example, has been widely adopted 
to meet the growing food requirements of the high population densities in many 
regions in Indonesia (Menz and Grist, 1999). However, growing crops on a 
continuous basis, with few residue and fertiliser additions, depletes the soil of its 
nutrients. Often these soils become so degraded that they have to be left fallow, and 
are usually invaded by Imperata grassland.  Imperata grasslands do have a number of 
uses for local people but these uses are of relatively low value (Tomich et al., 1996), 
which makes their possible conversion to more profitable uses a research priority. 
International drivers of land-use change in Indonesia have been strengthened recently 
due to increasing demands for bio-energy which create powerful incentives to clear 
indigenous forests to plant monocultures of palm oil, rape, maize and jatropha.   
                                                 
2 The range in population density in Sumatra in 2000 was between 191 people km
-2 in Lampung Province and 45 
people km
-2 in Jambi Province (BPS, 2000).    5
 
2.1.  The agroforestry system  
 
The upland land-use systems found in Indonesia are determined by the availability of 
standing water throughout the growing season. Where standing water is not available, 
non-rice crops such as maize, grain legumes and tuber crops are grown (Fagi, 1992). 
The presence of standing water largely depends on the slope of the land. Where the 
land is relatively flat, waterlogging tends to occur and wetland rice is grown. But, 
where the topography is sloping, the land is planted in a patchwork of rain-fed crops 
including tuber crops, maize, grain legumes, vegetables and tree crops (Fagi, 1992). 
Hedgerow-intercropping systems are often found on steeper slopes, where rice or 
maize is grown alongside tree-covered terraces. Many cropping patterns are found in 
dryland areas of Indonesia, including sequential plantings of maize (Fagi, 1992) and 
relay cropping of maize, soybean (Glycine max) and velvet bean (mucuna pruriens) 
(Sitompul et al., 1992).  
 
In this analysis, a rainfed hedgerow-intercropping system of Gliricidia sepium and 
maize is investigated. Gliricidia was selected because of its soil-amelioration 
capabilities (it is N-fixing and produces large quantities of biomass for mulch) and its 
ability to rapidly produce various commodities including firewood, fodder, or timber  
(Sanchez, 1995; Stewart, 1996).  Tree crops have a greater potential to sequester 
carbon than food crops, which in the presence of carbon credits, adds to the earning 
capability of this land-use system.  The system and the management regimes 
investigated are presented in detail in Section 3.2.  
 
3.  Method  
 
3.1. Economic model 
 
This paper uses a similar bioeconomic model to that of Wise and Cacho (2007). The 
model accounts for effects of the competitive and complementary interactions 
between trees and crops on the quantities of marketable outputs produced such as  
firewood and maize in addition to the carbon sequestered in the soil and tree biomass.  
The analysis is based on a landholder participating in a CDM project and receiving 
payments for carbon sequestration services. Carbon payments are based on the   6
production of certified emission reductions (CERs), the medium of exchange under 
the CDM. The present value of net revenues (NPV) obtained from an area of land A 
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where  t s represents the state of the land in year t and may be defined by a set of land-
quality indicators such as soil depth, soil-carbon content and soil fertility; x is a vector 
of management decisions such as the timing and frequency of pruning and harvesting, 
weeding and fertilising; k is the area of the farm planted to trees, which remains 
constant throughout the T years, and A – k is the area planted to crops. The cost of 
establishing a hectare of trees is cE and δ=(1+r) for the discount rate r. 
 











t y  is crop yield, 
a p  is the price of the crop and 
a
t c  is the per-hectare variable 
costs of preparing the land, sowing seeds and harvesting.  
 











t y  is the quantity of tree product harvested in year t, 
h p  is the price of tree 
product and 
h
t c  is the variable costs of harvesting. 
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The last term in equation (1) is the monetary benefit received for the sale of CERs, 
which depends on carbon accumulation in tree biomass and soil relative to the 












t y  is the eligible change in the stock of tree-biomass carbon, 
sc
t y  is the 
eligible change in soil-carbon stock, 
c p is the price of CERs and  t cm  is the annual 
carbon-monitoring cost per hectare.  
 
Equation (1) represents a single rotation and does not include the opportunity cost of 
keeping trees in the ground. The Faustman model is the standard approach to solving 
the infinite forestry planning horizon, and it has been extended by authors such as 
Hartman (1976), Comolli (1981), Bowes and Krutilla (1985), van Kooten et al. (1995) 
and Gutrich and Howarth (2007) to include non-timber benefits. Such models require 
that the length of each cycle (T), the management variables defined within the vector 
x, and initial land quality for each cycle Sn remain constant for all cycles n = 1,2,…∞. 
These assumptions do not hold when the quality of the land changes over time, 
possibly resulting in optimal tree areas and rotation lengths changing between cycles. 
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where, Sn is the quality of the land at the beginning of forestry cycle n, ) (⋅ t f  is the 
annual change in the state variable, and NPV is as defined in equation (1). The 
problem is solved by backward induction until convergence in  ) ( n S V  is achieved   8
(Kennedy, 1986). This involves combining a dynamic programming algorithm with 
the simulation model described below. 
 
3.2.  The biophysical simulation model  
 
The meta-model of Gliricidia hedgerows intercropped with two maize crops per year 
– developed by Wise and Cacho (2007) – was used in this study.  The model 
comprises three quadratic equations that interactively mimic soil-carbon changes, 
tree-biomass accumulation and crop-yield dynamics of the Gliridicia-maize system in 
response to changes in management.  The equations were estimated econometrically 
from the dataset of 6,200 data points created by Wise and Cacho (2007) using the 
SCUAF3 model.    
 
Wise and Cacho (2007) calibrated the SCUAF model to represent a ‘typical’ site in a 
sub-humid climate, with acidic, medium-textured soils of felsic parent material and 
imperfect drainage. The carbon and nitrogen contents of the system range between 10 
and 33 Mg C ha
-1 and 1.0 and 3.3 Mg N ha
-1, respectively – depending on previous 
land use and degree of degradation4. The lower values of this range represent a run-
down soil requiring regeneration.  The biophysical parameter values used to calibrate 
SCUAF are reported in Wise et al. (2007) and are not repeated here.  
 
The management parameters varied in SCUAF to create the original dataset were area 
planted to trees (k), fertiliser-application rate (fr), and firewood prune and harvest 
regime (hr). Total area (A) was set to 1.0 hectare so  1 0 ≤ ≤ k  (i.e. k also represents a 
fraction of the area of the smallholding). The values for these parameters were set at 
the beginning of a simulation and held constant throughout each 25-year rotation. The 
dataset was generated by increasing k at intervals of 0.1, resulting in 11 tree/crop area 
combinations.  These were then replicated for three prune/harvest regimes and four 
fertiliser regimes, resulting in 124 simulated management strategies.  The pruning and 
harvesting intensities are defined as percentages of the annual increment in total tree 
                                                 
3 SCUAF (Soil Changes Under Agriculture, Agroforestry, and Forestry) is a process model designed to 
estimate the effects that changes in soil properties (nutrients, carbon and soil depth) have on tree and 
crop productivity in response to changes in management (Young et al., 1998).  
4 These values fall at the lower end of the expected range of 10 to 120 Mg C ha
-1 for soils under a range 
of land uses in Sumatra (Delaney et al., 2002).   9
biomass. The sum of the prune and harvest intensities was set at 70% of the annual 
increment in total tree biomass. The remaining 30% of annual biomass increment was 
not removed from the trees; consequently the carbon contained in trees increased 
throughout the rotation.  The three prune/harvest scenarios simulated were: (1) 52.5% 
prune / 17.5% harvest; (2) 35% prune / 35% harvest; and (3) 0% prune / 70% harvest. 
Pruned biomass was returned to the soil to decompose and replenish soil carbon and 
nutrients whereas harvested biomass was removed for sale as firewood; therefore the 
soil-carbon stock is affected by harvest regime (hr).   The four fertiliser regimes 
comprised various combinations of nitrogen (N) and phosphorous (P) that were added 
annually to the crop component. In this study, however, it is assumed that no 
inorganic fertiliser is available and landholders are only able to manage soil quality 
and total carbon stocks by changing k and hr.  The resulting quadratic equations for 
the state of the soil ( t s ), the tree biomass ( t b ) and crop yield (
a
t y ), respectively are: 
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The explanatory variables in each equation (presented in Table 1) are those that fit the 
simulated treatments best ( 05 . 0 ≤ P ). The estimated R
2 and t values reported purely 
indicate the fit of the quadratic equations to the SCUAF output and are not an 
indication of the sampling/measurement errors that is required for statistical inference. 
The parameter values for which no t values are indicated are those that have been 
modified to represent a system with stronger complementary tree-crop interactions 
than those reported by Wise and Cacho (2007).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
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The meta-model, defined by equations (7), (8) and (9), was used to generate values 
for equations (2), (3) and (4). The crop, wood and carbon yields in these equations 
were calculated by simple differencing: 
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The resulting biophysical and economic outputs were used within the DP model 
represented by equations (5) and (6).  The values for the economic variables in the 
model are listed along with their sources in Table 2.  The prices are quoted in US 
dollars using an exchange rate of 10,000 Indonesian Rupiah per US Dollar. A real 
discount rate of 15% has been used to represent the rate of time preference of 
individual landholders in remote areas of Indonesia (Menz and Magcale-Macandog, 
1999). 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
4.  Results and Discussion 
 
Optimal decision rules and associated optimal state transitions were determined by 
solving the DP model for two carbon prices representing a ‘with carbon credits’ 
scenario (US$17.5) and a ‘without carbon credits’ scenario (US$0). The sensitivity of 
these optimal results to a change in discount rate was also tested by decreasing the 
base-case rate of discount from 15% to 5%.     
 
4.1.  Optimal decision rules 
 
The optimal state-contingent decisions – tree area (k*), cycle length (T*), and 
firewood-harvest regime (hr*) are plotted in Figure 2.  The effects of changing the 
carbon price (p
c) on optimal management are indicated in Figure 2 by the solid and   11
dashed curves within each of the six graphs. The sensitivity of the optimal decisions 
to a lower discount rate is determined by comparing the graphs between columns 1 
and 2 (Figure 2). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
The most noticeable finding from the simulated outputs is that planting only crops is  
always the profit-maximising strategy for landholders to adopt when soil quality (soil-
carbon content) is relatively high (> 22 Mg C ha
-1, for the base-case parameters used 
in this study). But, where the soil-carbon stock is relatively degraded (< 22 Mg C ha
-1) 
it becomes optimal to convert some of the area to trees ( 1 0 < > k ). Combining trees 
with crops when soil quality is relatively poor is optimal because crops are less 
productive in degraded soils (i.e., the opportunity cost of growing trees is lower) and 
because Gliricidia trees, when appropriately managed, are able to restore soil quality 
through nitrogen-fixation and residue additions.  When optimal management 
strategies involve growing trees with crops this implies that the complementarities 
between the tree and crop components exceed the competitive interactions and 
represents any point along the PPF between ‘w’ and ‘z’ in Figure 1.  The actual 
optimal point along this section of the PPF depends on the prices of tree products 
relative to the price of maize and on the discount rate. This is discussed in more detail 
below.  
 
Assuming a 15% discount rate (left panel in Figure 2) and in the absence of carbon 
payments (dotted lines), it is optimal to convert a minimum of 10% of the area to trees 
when  t s  is between 15.5 and 17.5 Mg C ha
-1 (Figure 2A) for rotations of between 7 
and 9 years (Figure 2C), and to return none of the pruned biomass to the soil as 
residues (Figure 2E).  It is optimal to undertake this minimal move towards trees 
because the soil is still productive enough to produce acceptable maize yields. 
However, at values of  t s  less than 15.5 Mg C ha
-1 it is optimal to convert between 70 
and 90% of the land to trees for rotations of between 24 and 44 years, and to only 
harvest 20% of pruned biomass. This larger commitment towards trees occurs because 
the profitability of crops has been reduced and it is in the interests of the landholder to 
improve the quality of the soil through residue additions and nitrogen fixation.    
   12
If a lower discount rate of 5% is assumed and carbon still has no recognised market 
value (right panel in Figure 2) similar optimal-decision rules are observed but the 
lines shift to the right and the soil-carbon content must now decrease to only 20.5 Mg 
C ha
-1 before a minimal shift towards trees (10% of the area for rotations of between 9 
and 13 years with no residue additions) becomes optimal (Figures 3B & D).  Also, at 
this lower discount rate, a larger commitment to trees becomes optimal at a slightly 
higher soil-carbon value of 16.5 Mg C ha
-1, and involves converting slightly lower 
proportions of the area to trees (60 to 80%) for longer rotations of between 43 and 50 
years and harvesting only 20% of pruned biomass (Figures 3B, D & F, respectively).  
When discount rates are lower, the present value of the delayed benefits from trees is 
larger making longer tree cycles optimal.  
 
Carbon payments provide incentives to convert crops to trees earlier (i.e., at higher  
t s  values) and to keep trees for longer rotations (compare solid lines with dashed 
lines in Figure 2); and these effects are greater at higher discount rates.  When the 
discount rate is 15%, for example, carbon payments make it optimal to switch to 10% 
trees for between 31 and 48 years (compared with the 7 to 9 years without carbon 
payments) when the soil-carbon content is between 17.5 and 20.5 Mg C ha
-1 
(compared with the 15.5 to 17.5 Mg C ha
-1 without carbon payments) and to between 
70% and 90% for between 43 and 49 years (compared with the 24 to 44 years without 
carbon payments), when less than 17.5 Mg C ha
-1 (compared with 15.5 Mg C ha
-1 
without carbon payments) (compare Figures 3C & D).  These threshold values for the 
soil-carbon stock at which it becomes optimal to convert some of the land from crops 
to trees increases in the presence of carbon payments because trees become more 
financially competitive and because soil-carbon stocks across the entire area are 
maintained or increased (i.e., liabilities from soil-carbon losses that occur under crops 
are avoided).  
 
It is noticeable that irrespective of soil-carbon level, discount rate and whether carbon 
payments are being received or not, it is never optimal to switch entirely from crops to 
trees.  This is because the complementary interactions between the trees and the crops 
exceed the competitive interactions.  
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4.2.  Optimal state paths 
 
The trajectories of the state variable ( t s ) that result from applying the optimal-
decision rules over a period of 150 years are plotted in Figure 3.  The associated 
optimal decisions (for the first 8 cycles) that drive the trajectories of soil-carbon 
stocks over time are listed in Table 3. If the initial soil quality is relatively good ( 0 s  = 
33 Mg C ha
-1) it is optimal to exploit the system by continuously planting maize crops 
annually which reduces soil carbon for 44 years until it reaches an equilibrium value 
of 28.67 Mg C ha
-1, where it can be maintained through the addition of crop residues.   
 
When the initial soil quality is relatively poor ( 0 s  = 12 Mg C ha
-1) it is optimal to 
build up soil carbon to a plateau (21.97, 18.34, 22.0 or 21.02 Mg C ha
-1 depending on 
the price of carbon and the discount rate) by converting between 10% and 90% of the 
area from crops to trees for between 42 and 111 years and returning up to 80% of the 
pruned biomass to the system as residues (Table 3).  Once these plateaus have been 
reached it is then optimal to switch the entire area back to a cropping system that can 
be maintained at an equilibrium state through the addition of crop residues.  It is 
unlikely that an equilibrium state would be reached without trees if crop residues were 
not returned to the system.    
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
The introduction of carbon payments and the change in discount rate have no effect 
on the optimal soil-carbon path when  0 s  = 33 Mg C ha
-1; it is always optimal to plant 
crops and not to participate in a carbon-sink project. When the system is relatively 
degraded ( 0 s = 12 Mg C ha
-1), however, carbon-sequestration payments only give 
landholders incentives to increase carbon stocks (compare Figures 4A & B) when the 
discount rate is high (Figures 3 & 4 and Table 3).  In this situation, landholders have 
short-term planning horizons and will minimise the time their land is planted to trees 
(because this incurs opportunity costs in the form of forgone crop revenues) by 
converting to crops as soon as the soil-carbon level is sufficiently high to sustain crop   14
productivity. Without carbon-sequestration payments, landholders convert from 90% 
trees to 90% crops within 24 years (Figure 4A and Table 3). Carbon payments give 
incentives to these landholders to increase the rotation length of their trees from 24 to 
43 years in order to increase carbon-stock levels. Landholders with lower rates of time 
preference (5% discount rate) tend to have a medium- to long-term planning horizon 
and this is reflected in the longer tree rotation of 44 years; even though a slightly 
smaller area of 80% is planted to trees. For these landholders, carbon payments have 
little effect on the optimal carbon stock and on the optimal management strategies. 
Instead, the complementary role of trees on crop productivity – for example their 
ability to fix nitrogen in soils – is taken advantage of by extending the duration that at 
least 10% of the area is planted to trees.  
  
So far only soil-carbon stocks have been discussed, but it is also informative to 
investigate the optimal trajectories of total eligible-carbon (Figure 4), which includes 
aboveground biomass carbon as well as soil carbon, as this reflects the cumulative 
stream of annual carbon payments. The trajectories of the eligible-carbon stock 
emphasise the positive relationship between p
c and discount rate on the quantity of 
CERs associated with optimal management regimes. The gradual increase in total 
eligible carbon stock after the initial tree rotation reflects the situation where it is 
optimal to plant trees in only 10% of the area. Since no trees are grown in cases where 
the initial soil-carbon level is high, total eligible-carbon stock trajectories are the same 
as those presented in Figure 3, and are therefore not shown.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4] 
 
5.  Summary and conclusions 
 
In this study we investigated whether agroforestry systems might be a profitable way 
of alleviating existing trends in increasing deforestation, soil degradation and land-
based greenhouse-gas emissions in Sumatra under the assumption that carbon-credit 
payments are available. An econometric-production model capable of simulating tree-
crop-soil interactions was developed and used within a dynamic-programming 
algorithm to determine optimal combinations of tree/crop area, tree-rotation length,   15
and firewood harvest.  Results show that the initial soil-quality (soil-carbon stock) and 
assumptions about landholders’ rate of time preference drive land-management 
strategies.   
 
In relatively good quality soils, irrespective of discount rate (5% or 15%) and whether 
participating in a carbon-sink project or not, profit maximising landholders will 
always only plant crops. This strategy leads to soil-carbon stocks declining to a steady 
state where it can be maintained provided crop residues are returned to the system. In 
this situation, no incentive exists to participate in carbon-sink projects because 
landholders are liable for soil-carbon losses.  
 
In relatively poor quality soils optimal management strategies involve planting trees 
with crops to take advantage of the positive effects of trees on soil quality (soil 
nutrient and carbon levels) and the additional income from carbon payments for the 
larger stocks of carbon. In these cases optimal management involves a mix of tree-
crop areas, tree-rotation lengths and firewood harvest regimes that is sensitive to the 
discount rate of landholders and whether carbon payments are available or not.  For 
example, landholders with short-term planning horizons (high discount rates) 
minimise the time their land is planted to trees to between 42 and 84 years (‘without’ 
and ‘with’ carbon payments, respectively) because growing trees incurs opportunity 
costs in the form of forgone crop revenues.  Landholders with lower rates of time 
preference (5% discount rate), however, tend to have a medium- to long-term 
planning horizon and allow their trees to grow for between 81 and 111 years 
(‘without’ and ‘with’ carbon payments, respectively).  In both cases, as soon as the 
soil-carbon level is sufficiently high to sustain crop productivity the landholders 
convert all their land back to crops, where the system is maintained at a steady state 
by returning crop residues to the soil. The soil-carbon level at which this equilibrium 
is reached depends on the price of carbon and the discount rate. These findings are 
consistent with those of Wise and Cacho (2007), although in these cases, crop 
residues and not fertilisers are used to maintain the system’s steady state.  
 
An additional complexity to the optimal management strategies of landholders with 
low discount rates is that the payments for sequestered carbon have little effect on the 
optimal carbon stocks and are not what is driving the decision to plant trees. In these   16
cases, it is the trees’ abilities to improve soil quality (nitrogen fixation and soil 
amelioration) and therefore crop productivity that drives the landholders’ decisions to 
extend the duration that trees are grown.   
 
Finally, certain issues presented in this paper require further investigation. Firstly, it is 
uncertain what the implications for landholder food security would be if landholders 
did adopt the optimal strategies of converting 80 to 90% of their land to trees for 24 to 
44 years.  Secondly, in many areas of south-east Asia crop residues are often not 
returned to the soil but are burnt before the land is replanted to crops. To investigate 
the implications of this on optimal management and the steady-state reached by the 
system will require that the necessary parameters of the meta-model are modified 
accordingly and the dynamic-programming algorithm rerun.  Thirdly, the analysis 
reported here is deterministic and many of the real-world risks and uncertainties (such 
as poorly defined property rights, poor governance, fires, drought, and illegal 
harvesting) that threaten the productivity and profitability of such systems have not 
been accounted for.  Areas of future research would therefore involve modifying the 
model to make it stochastic and investigating mechanisms for promoting good 
governance. Finally, the implications of payments for emission reductions generated 
when the firewood that is harvested is used to substitute for fossil fuels needs to be 
investigated. This area of research is particularly relevant and urgent since oil prices 
were fluctuating between US$90 and US$100 per barrel at the end of 2007, and there 
is a growing global demand for bio-energy.   
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Y1 = bundle of commodities produced 
from land planted to trees 
Y2 = bundle of commodities produced 





Figure 1. Pareto efficient production possibilities of landholders when (1) not 
receiving payments for positive environmental externalities and (2) when 
positive external effects are internalised through carbon-sequestration 
payments 
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Figure 2. Optimal management regimes obtained by solving the dynamic-
programming model for ‘with carbon payment’ and ‘without carbon 
payment’ scenarios under two discount rates, at base-case values for the 
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Figure 3. Optimal state paths associated with the optimal management decisions 
obtained by solving the dynamic-programming model for ‘with carbon 
payment’ and ‘without carbon payment’ scenarios under two discount rates, 
at base-case values for the economic and biophysical parameters 
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Figure 4. The trajectory of the total eligible-carbon stock associated with the optimal 
management regimes for the different carbon prices and discount rates for 
the poor-quality soil scenarios     23
  
Table 1. Base-case values (coefficients) for the dependent variables of the quadratic 
equations defining the biophysical numerical model 
 
  Soil carbon (β )  Tree biomass (α )  Crop yield (δ ) 
   Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
0  0.7790  (17.18)  -0.8730 (-11.16) -0.3920   
1  0.9684 (238.65) 0.9910 (628.36) 0.1737   
2  0.0004 (4.28) -0.0048  (-161.99) -0.0031  (-11.31) 
3  0.0062  (8.45)  -0.0005 (-11.59) -0.0003 (-4.48) 
4  0.00005 (5.25)  0.2522  (121.85)  -0.0017   
5  -0.6216 (-24.49)  -0.0003 (-39.31) 0.0010  (23.21) 
6  0.0804 (5.16)  0.0871  (11.55)  -  - 
7  0.0077  -0.0021  (-12.33)  -  - 
8  -0.0066 (-31.12)  0.0051  (2.88)  -  - 
9  - -  -0.00005  (-2.63)  - - 
10  - -  2.7750  (50.42)  - - 
11  - -  -2.0200  (-40.82)  - - 
12  - -  0.0020  (4.84)  - - 
R
2    0.99    0.70    0.99 
The associated t-values are given as a measure of the significance of each coefficient (a 95% 
significance requires the t-value be  08 . 2 + ≥ or  08 . 2 − ≤ ). 
 
   24
Table 2. Base-case parameter values for economic variables 
 
 
Sources: a: Wise and Cacho (2005a) , b: Menz and Magcale-Macandog (1999) c: Nelson et al. (1998) & Grist et al. 
(1999), d: Cacho et al. (2003), e: Katial-Zemany and Alam (2004), f: NWPC, (2005), g: Wise and Cacho (2005a), h: 
Young et al. (1998). 
 
Description Value  Units  Source 
Firewood price   6.0  $ Mg
-1 a 
Price of carbon  17.5  $ Mg
-1 d 
Price of maize  180.0  $ Mg
-1 e 
Discount rate  15  %  b 
Hedgerow-establishment cost  64.5  $  c 
C-monitoring costs  1.0  $  ha
-1yr
-1 g 
Variable costs for crop  210.0  $ ha
-1 c 
Price of labour  1.5  $ day
-1 f 
Maize-harvest labour  5  days Mg
-1 c 
Prune and harvest labour  3  days Mg
-1 c 
Labour for weeding  40  days ha
-1 yr
-1 c 
Carbon content of wood  50  %  h   25
Table 3. Optimal decisions over eight cycles for the two carbon-price scenarios 
(scenario 1 = US$17.5; scenario 2 = US$0), at a high (15%) and low (5%) 
discount rate 
1212 1212
10 . 9 0 . 9 0 . 8 0 . 8 4 32 44 44 4
2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 41 9 11 11
3 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 9 13 13
40 00 . 1 0 . 1 1 11 3 1 3
50 00 . 10 1 11 51




12 02 02 02 0 8 8 . 1 - 5 2 . 4 3 9 6 . 3 2 0 6 . 6
2 100 100 100 100 89.0 -48.7 436.8 247.9
3 0 100 100 100 89.0 -47.4 466.0 277.4
4 0 0 100 100 89.0 -47.3 482.6 294.3
5 0 0 100 0 89.0 -47.3 493.1 295.4
6 0 0 100 0 89.0 -47.2 498.4 296.4
70 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 8 . 6 2 9 7 . 4
80 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 8 . 9 2 9 8 . 3
Cycle
Optimal tree area (k*) Optimal cycle length (T*, yrs)
15% discount rate 5% discount rate 15% discount rate 5% discount rate
Optimal harvest (hr*, %) Cumulative NPV (US$ ha
-1)
15% discount rate 5% discount rate 15% discount rate 5% discount rate
 